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 Driving a wedge between friends? The Court of Justice of the EU and its 
citizens in the case of welfare benefits 
 
Adrienne Yong
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Abstract 
It is widely acknowledged that the Lisbon Treaty entering into force at the end of 2009 sparked the 
beginning of a potential constitutionalisation of the EU fundamental rights rhetoric. This is mainly 
due to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union becoming binding on all Member 
States, and the way in which the Treaty set out accession to the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Integrating a rights discourse into the Court of Justice of the EU’s decision-making initially 
appeared to be a normative possibility because of these constitutional changes. However, the reality 
has not been so positive, and arguably can now be considered a missed opportunity. A number of 
recent cases heard before the CJEU, for instance, have highlighted the relative weakness of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s provisions on fundamental rights. This article evaluates how and why reality has differed 
from early projections by using the CJEU judgments on welfare benefits as case studies. The article 
argues that the high standard of rights protection as exhibited in a number of past cases raises 
questions in respect of the Court’s judicial decision-making in the present day. 
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1 Introduction 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, commentators were both equally positive and negative 
about its likely effects.
1
 These heated discussions, which focused mostly on the constitutional nature 
of the Treaty’s failed predecessor, the Draft Constitution of the EU, eventually culminated in an 
agreement that one of the most significant changes the Treaty would bring about was an increased 
level of fundamental human rights protection.
2
 In art. 6 TEU, the previously non-binding Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter, the Charter) was raised in equal status to the Treaties,
3
 and 
the long considered accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was set out. 
Both developments appeared to hold special significance in the overall picture of the development of 
fundamental human rights protection in the EU.
4
 Prior to this, it was only through judgments of the 
Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter, the Court or CJEU) that the enforcement of fundamental rights 
could be secured for the intended beneficiaries – EU citizens. 
 
The citizens of the EU, a community of all nationals from the 28 EU Member States,
5
 became a 
central focus of the EU institutions and Treaty drafters after 1993, where the Maastricht Treaty 
introduced social and political provisions to the Union. In particular, these individuals were granted 
citizenship of the Union and its requisite rights under arts 18-20 EC (now arts 20-22 TFEU). After 
1998,
6
 the Court further developed the concept of EU citizenship by interpreting it as a provision 
                                                          
1
 See Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts’ (2008) 45 CMLR 617; Jean-
Victor Louis, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish ‘No’.: National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity–Legal 
Options and Practical Limits’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 429; Gráinne De Búrca, 
‘Reflections on the EU's path from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty’ [2008] Fordham Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper 1124586. 
2
 Article 6 TEU. 
3
 TEU and TFEU. 
4
 In this article, the term ‘fundamental human rights’ will be used interchangeably with ‘fundamental rights’ and 
refer to EU specific human rights, mainly found in the Charter. This will differ from European human rights, 
which refer broadly to rights under the Charter but also including the provisions in the ECHR. 
5
 Soon to be 27 Member States. Article 20 TFEU states, ‘Every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union.’ 
6
 Martinez Sala (C-85/96) [1998] ECR I-2691. 
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which granted substantive rights to non-economically active citizens.
7
 Long before this, however, the 
Court’s jurisprudence on fundamental rights also indicated an early interest and commitment to 
protecting fundamental rights. Stauder v Ulm in 1969 was the first case to establish that fundamental 
rights could, and would, broaden the remit of the Treaty,
8
 then in 1970, the Court in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft confirmed that fundamental rights protection was a general principle of the EU.
9
 
Slowly but surely, fundamental rights became instrumental in more of the Court’s final decisions;10 in 
this way, it began to develop a relationship with its citizens. It is argued that in these cases, the Court 
was attempting to build an identity for individuals in the EU by highlighting the rights they enjoyed 
from an increased the level of protection of fundamental human rights. This was further enhanced by 
virtue of their EU citizenship. The introduction of EU citizenship status was one way of ensuring the 
citizen became the primary focus of matters heard before the Court. 
 
The argument here is that the initial picture painted of citizens’ rights in the EU by the Court – 
protecting their fundamental rights and protecting their status as citizens in the EU – suggested there 
was potential to foster a greater sense of belief amongst EU citizens in their identities as citizens with 
EU citizenship and who enjoyed fundamental rights protection. Simply put, this would have been one 
way to positively impact upon an individual’s life directly, bringing direct attention to the rights to 
which they were entitled.
11
 From this, the Court developed a new paradigm under which it declared 
that citizenship was ‘the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.12 Arguably, the 
potential effect of this declaration read with the constitutional guarantee that fundamental rights were 
protected as a general principle of EU law was to ensure that the citizen was at the heart of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. In EU citizenship law, the Court began to readily recognise and protect various types of 
                                                          
7
 These included welfare benefits, rights to one’s name and identity, rights to reside for family members; see 
Trojani (C-456/02) [2004] ECR I-07573; Carpenter (C-60/00) [2001] ECR I-6279; MRAX (C-459/99) [2002] 
ECR I-6591; Garcia Avello (C-148/02) [2003] ECR I-11613; Zhu and Chen (C-200/02) [2004] ECR I-9925; 
Grunkin and Paul (C-353/06) [2008] ECR I-7639; Metock and Others (C-127/08) [2008] ECR I-6241. 
8
 Stauder v. Ulm (C-29/69) [1969] ECR I-0419. 
9
 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (C-11/70) [1970] ECR I-1125. 
10
 Wachauf (C-5/88) [1989] ECR I-2609; ERT (C-260/89) [1991] ECR I-02925. 
11
 See Carole Lyons, ‘A Voyage Around Article 8: An Historical Evaluation on the Fate of European Union 
Citizenship’ (1997) 17 YEL 135; Sybilla Fries and Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the 
European Court of Justice’ (1998) 4 EPL 533; Jo Shaw, ‘The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship’ 
(1998) 61 MLR 293. 
12
 Grzelczyk (C-184/99) [2001] ECR I-6193. 
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fundamental rights, the most prominent being equal treatment, mainly for welfare, and rights to 
private and family life.
13
 Unfortunately, the reality of the current situation is not as positive as it once 
was because of recent developments specifically addressing concerns surrounding equal treatment to 
welfare benefits amounting to ‘benefit tourism’. Three cases form the case studies for this article – 
Brey in 2013, Dano in 2014 and Alimanovic in 2015.
14
 This article will argue that the developments 
early on suggesting a potential for greater rights protection are no longer indicative because of a new 
approach taken by the Court, which are seen in the latter two cases. Comparing all three will highlight 
the differences, and it is argued that this new approach has now undermined protection of 
fundamental rights. 
 
The article begins by looking at the relationship between the Court and EU citizens. This is done by 
way of analysing observable patterns of the court’s decision-making in to demonstrate that as 
citizenship and fundamental human rights has become more constitutionalised, the Court has 
strengthened its positive relationship with its subjects by reinforcing their rights as EU citizens. As the 
Court is the arbiter of rights in EU law for EU citizens, a positive relationship is defined as one in 
which the citizen is able to derive clear and tangible benefits from the judgments of the cases 
examined. The article then turns to the now deteriorating situation, as a result of which it has become 
evident that the Court has retreated from taking a previously observable liberal stance in regards to 
equal treatment in respect of welfare benefits. Brey, Dano and Alimanovic will be used as case studies 
to demonstrate the change in approach over time. The CJEU’s recent approaches are argued to be 
legally and normatively difficult to reconcile with those which it has taken previously, particularly 
those relating to both the development of citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights. It is 
ultimately argued that because of the high expectations initially established by the Court in respect of 
a strengthened rights rhetoric, the unwillingness it is now showing to reapply a liberal interpretation 
has proven problematic in terms of the enjoyment of rights of EU citizens. 
 
                                                          
13
 See fn.7. 
14
 Brey (C-140/12) 19 Sept 2013; Dano (C-333/13) 11 Nov 2014; Alimanovic (C-67/14) 15 Sept 2015. 
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2 The Court and its Citizens – a developing friendship? 
In the early 2000s, it is argued that the Court went to great lengths to cultivate what could be 
described as almost a friendship with its subjects, the EU citizens. In particular, attention was paid to 
citizens who were non-economically active. It is important to draw particular attention to this point, as 
in the context of fundamental human rights, early cases guaranteeing the legal effectiveness of such 
rights are still largely contextualised in relation to the internal market, or in relation to exercising 
other rights related to the market.
15
 Cumulatively over the years, in the context of settling disputed 
areas of citizens’ rights, there has been a noticeable shift away from the Court only being prepared to 
consider the economic worth of its citizens, and towards accepting that fundamental rights protection, 
where such rights are of relevance, must also be considered. It was confirmed in 1991 that the EU 
itself ‘cannot accept measures which are incompatible with observance of the human rights thus 
recognized and guaranteed.’16 
 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to escape the confines of the internal market even when discussing 
distinctly non-economic rights in the EU. With the EU’s historical background firmly rooted in 
developing a common single market, it is perhaps unsurprising that embedded initially in the Court’s 
approach to fundamental human rights was a requirement of some form of financial reciprocity.
17
 
However, this did not obscure the fact that the Court recognised a separate constitutional need to 
protect the rights of its citizens. It was cautious at first when outwardly affording judicial weight to 
fundamental rights protection in its judgments, but later aligned a rights-based approach with the 
Union’s growing political and social needs and objectives.18 This was done originally through the 
right to equal treatment and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality.
19
 It is argued here that 
this is actually indicative of the Court’s indirect recognition of the protection of fundamental rights as 
                                                          
15
 Stauder v. Ulm (C-29/69); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (C-11/70); Wachauf (C-5/88). 
16
 ERT (C-260/89). 
17
 See Baumbast (C-413/99) [2002] ECR I-7091 and the unreasonable burden criteria. This was a political 
matter. 
18
 The Maastricht Treaty was the first to introduce most of these types of provisions, with citizenship status one 
key example.  
19
 Article 18 TFEU. 
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non-discrimination has now been recognised as a fundamental right in the Charter.
20
 Given that the 
EU did not originally set out to protect fundamental human rights, the principle of non-discrimination 
is the best example of an indirect manifestation of these rights early on as a general principle of EU 
law. 
 
In cases on both citizenship and fundamental human rights, the Court has been seen to interpret the 
rights under citizenship status in particular to the benefit of the individual claiming protection from 
the Treaty. Understanding these cases in this way is argued to be a contributing factor in the Court 
gaining favour amongst individuals who could now enjoy these rights,
21
 as the scope ratione materiae 
and scope ratione personae of citizenship was broadened. It is argued that fundamental rights have 
played a role in this. In a number of cases, particularly on Union citizenship rights in the mid-2000s, 
equal treatment to welfare was sought by Union citizens who had moved to other Member States.
22
 As 
noted, non-discrimination is how fundamental rights initially permeated the Court’s jurisprudence and 
this has now evolved. What can be inferred from these cases is that the growing fundamental rights 
discourse appeared to influence the liberalisation of the Court’s judgments in citizenship.  
 
References to fundamental human rights can be seen in both an explicit and implicit manner in the 
Court’s judgments themselves, and are especially   prominent in situations involving interests other 
than those that are of an economic character.
23
 Prior to the existence of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights the Court frequently referred to the ECHR, a practice that persisted even after the Charter came 
into being. The ERT case in 1991, for instance, saw the Court argue that the compatibility of 
fundamental human rights under the ECHR had to be considered in all situations it was pertinent to do 
so. Here, despite the main question  the case being primarily concerned with the free movement of 
services in the internal market, the Court found that it was necessary to consider the fundamental 
                                                          
20
 Article 20, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 83/02 [2010] OJ C-83/389. 
21Agustín José Menéndez, ‘European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast’ (2009) No. 11 ARENA 
Working Paper 1; Jo Shaw, ‘The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union’ (1997) 22 ELR 
554. 
22
 Sala (C-85/96); Grzelczyk (C-184/99); Bidar (C-209/03) [2005] ECR I-2119; Collins (C-138/02) [2004] ECR 
I-11613; Trojani (C-456/02); De Cuyper (C-406/04) [2006] ECR I-6947.  
23
 Carpenter (C-60/00); Chen (C-200/02); MRAX (C-459/99). 
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rights of the individual.
24
 Following this decision, the case has been repeatedly cited in situations 
concerning various different areas of EU competence including competition law, immigration and 
citizenship, further constitutionalising fundamental rights.
25
 What the Court can be argued to have 
been doing when assessing proportionality is simply adhering to the ERT doctrine. This then 
expanded the scope of fundamental human rights protection as interpreted judicially, and added to the 
constitutionalisation of such a rights discourse. 
 
It would appear, therefore, that the fundamental rights acquis promoted by the Court through its 
decision in ERT served as the legal basis for the later slow, but steady, proliferation of fundamental 
rights in cases relating to areas of law in which it was most pertinent to protect such rights, notably 
the free movement of persons. This area of EU law concerns not only workers’ rights, but also 
citizenship rights,
26
 a concept which was introduced two years after ERT was decided. It has been 
noted that because of the EU’s economic foundations, it is unsurprising that initial discussions in this 
area began at the by predominantly considering the rights of citizens who contributed to the economy, 
workers, rather than considering whether it would be proportionate and consistent with citizenship to 
confer citizens’ rights to non-economically active individuals. For this reason, the Court, in the years 
following ERT, arguably made significant progress in the promotion and interpretation of fundamental 
rights by bringing the scope of the citizenship provisions into closer alignment to those of 
fundamental rights, thereby enhancing their status as citizens of the Union by way of providing 
additional substantive rights. 
                                                          
24
 ERT (C-260/89), para. 44. 
25
 A v Commission (T-10/93) [1994] ECR II-0179; Limburgse Vinyl Maastschappij and others v Commission (T-
305/94) [1999] ECR II-0931; Cimenteries CBR and others v Commission (T-25/95) [2000] ECR II-0491; Cheil 
Jedang v Commission (T-220/00) [2003] ECR II-2473; UEFA v Commission (T-55/08) [2011] ECR II-0271; 
FIFA v Commission (T-68/08) [2011] ECR II-0349; Scaramuzza (C-76/93) [1993] ECR I-5721; Familiapress 
(C-368/95) [1991] ECR I-2925; Albany (C-67/96) [1999] ECR I-5751; Annibaldi (C-309/96) [1997] ECR I-
7493; Brentjens (C-115/97) [1999] ECR I-6025; Drijvende Bokken (C-219/97) [1999] ECR I-6121; Connolly v 
Commission (C-274/99) [2001] ECR I-1611; Carpenter (C-60/00); Roquette Frères (C-94/00) [2002] ECR I-
9011; Schmidberger (C-112/00) [2003] ECR I-5659; Orfanopoulos and Oliveri (C-482/01 and C-493/01) [2004] 
ECR I-5257; Omega (C-36/02) [2004] ECR I-9609; Karner (C-71/02) [2004] ECR I-3025; Commission v 
Germany (C-441/02) [2006] ECR I-3449; Parliament v Council (C-540/04) [2006] ECR I-5769; Laserdisken 9 
(C-479/04) [2006] ECR I-8089; Sopropé (C-349/07) [2008] ECR I-10369; NS (C-411/10) [2011] ECR I-
103905; Fransson (C-617/10) 26 Feb 2013; Iida (C-40/11) 8 Nov 2012; Berlington (C-98/14) 11 June 2015; 
Safe Interenvios (C-235/14) 10 March 2016. 
26
 See Collins (C-138/02); Trojani (C-456/02); Vatsouras (C-22/08) [2009] ECR I-4585. 
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In this manner, it was through the heightened status of citizenship that the right to equal treatment 
could be realised. This can primarily be attributed to the way in which the Court interpreted non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality as a right under EU citizenship. Having established that 
equal treatment was, in effect, also a fundamental right, it can be argued that citizenship and 
fundamental rights go hand in hand. It is by virtue of being an EU citizen that various interpretations 
of rights to equal treatment could be conferred. Other fundamental rights were then later interpreted as 
also falling within the scope of citizens’ rights, mainly those deriving from art. 8 ECHR, the right to 
private and family life.
27
 As outlined above, the Charter then came into being and became binding, 
and included its own provisions on the right to respect for private and family life.
28
 The logical 
assumption to be made as a result of this development was that EU citizens could now explicitly rely 
upon, and more readily invoke, the provisions of the Charter as a legal foundation for the protection of 
their fundamental rights. 
 
It perhaps comes as a surprise, therefore, that the previously observable trend of fundamental rights 
protection in citizenship jurisprudence has apparently begun to so sharply turn the other over the 
course of the last three years. In this regard it is the Court’s decisions in the area of welfare benefits 
that have sparked the most contentious debate since the passing of the Lisbon Treaty. These cases and 
the Court’s reasoning in them can also be interpreted as the reason for an observable decline in the 
level of fundamental rights protection in the EU. This is despite the various constitutional drivers in 
the Lisbon Treaty which should have suggested instigated the opposite. The phenomenon of so-called 
‘benefit tourism’ also raises questions of EU citizenship status and other associated rights. These 
issues are derived from the fact that, originally, benefits and equal treatment in respect of state welfare 
were reserved for individuals who contributed to their host Member State’s economy after crossing 
borders to other Member States.
29
 Due to the introduction and impact of fundamental human rights 
                                                          
27
 See fn.7. 
28
 Article 7 Charter. 
29
 And their family, see Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Community OJ L257/2. 
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protection, case law indicated that it was no longer acceptable to discriminate on the grounds of 
nationality in relation to these matters. This brought the scope of non-discrimination in respect of 
citizenship rights closer to that of fundamental rights. It is here where the argument against the decline 
of fundamental rights protection can be seen most prominently. 
 
3 A wedge between friends – the case of welfare benefits 
In 2013, the Court issued its judgment in Brey.
30
 This case is used here as the benchmark for how it 
has treated benefit tourism and welfare under the citizenship provisions in the Treaty after Lisbon. It 
is particularly relevant as a point of comparison for the current situation as to rights protection in the 
EU. Comparing this judgment to a number that have followed it, for instance, allows us to clearly 
discern the Court’s change of heart. In Brey, the claimant and his wife were both German nationals 
living in Austria and claiming welfare benefit. When applying for an additional benefit to that which 
they were already receiving, their application was automatically refused because they were unable to 
prove they were economically active. This automatic denial was held to be against the general 
principle of non-discrimination, on the basis that if there were conditions placed on benefits being 
claimed by moving Union citizens by a host Member State, these conditions had to be compatible 
with EU law – in this case, non-discrimination, which, as noted above, was also considered to be a 
fundamental right. Specific reference was made to the notion of proportionality, and the language 
used by the Court appeared to favour a wide interpretation of the provisions governing cross-border 
welfare,
31
 particularly to ensure that the citizens’ rights were properly considered. Notably, it was 
remarked that ‘the mere fact that a national of a Member State receives social assistance is not 
sufficient to show that he constitutes an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the 
host Member State.’32 This liberal and approach to proportionality was ultimately beneficial to the 
claimant’s enjoyment of welfare benefits. 
 
                                                          
30
 Brey (C-140/12). 
31
 Ibid paras 70-77. 
32
 Ibid para. 75. 
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The above excerpt from the Court’s judgment is suggestive of its intention to condemn unfair 
differential treatment of those claiming welfare benefits; a sentiment which potentially emerged as a 
consequence of the Treaty’s original exclusion of non-economically active citizens, a provision that 
can be considered inconsistent with the liberal rights acquis behind the promotion and substantiation 
of citizenship status we see today. More troublingly, though, to perpetuate such a prejudice would be 
inconsistent with the universal nature of fundamental human rights. It is for this reason that the Brey 
decision is heralded as a significant and positive step for the integration of fundamental human rights 
into the Court’s jurisprudence relating to welfare benefits. Although no explicit mention of 
fundamental rights is made in the judgment, the previous section of this article’s interpretation of the 
right to non-discrimination as a fundamental right makes this point highly pertinent. The expansion of 
the scope of citizens’ rights, whether this was explicitly intended or otherwise, had the effect of 
aligning EU citizenship and its associated legal rules with protection of fundamental human rights, the 
latter of which is decidedly broader given its universal foundations. However, developments in CJEU 
jurisprudence that followed Dano have been received less enthusiastically. 
 
Interestingly, neither the Court nor the claimant mentioned fundamental rights in Brey, unlike in Dano 
where one of the questions raised specifically queried whether fundamental rights could be invoked in 
the context of justifying the conferral of welfare benefits to the claimant. Excluding fundamental 
rights might be said to be political. For instance, the Court, by refusing to engage with fundamental 
rights specifically, would not need to entertain any questions on the application of such rights. The 
facts of the Dano case and the questions referred to the Court were similar to that of Brey. The 
claimant was a Romanian national living in Germany. She had attempted to claim benefits, but was 
denied due to her lack of economic activity. In both the Advocate General’s Opinion and the 
judgment itself, the conclusions made by the Court were ‘at odds’33 with the decision reached in Brey. 
In Dano, for instance, the Court held it was acceptable to deny the claimant benefits because it would 
be desirable  to ‘prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State's 
                                                          
33
 Adrienne Yong, ‘Judgment (Grand Chamber) in Case C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig (11 Nov 
2014)’ (2014) 3 Cyprus Human Rights Law Review 217. 
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welfare system to fund their means of subsistence’.34 This conclusion, however, appeared to exclude 
any consideration of equal treatment, which by the time Dano was decided, had become a binding 
right under art. 20 of the Charter. By apparently choosing to ignore point, the Court apparently took a 
significant backwards step in the development of EU constitutional fundamental rights protection. 
 
The tone of the Dano judgment was, for instance, decidedly more cautious than that of Brev, with a 
stricter and apparently less liberal interpretation of EU citizens’ rights.35 Focus was placed on 
considering ‘the financial situation of each person concerned’,36 which is suggestive of a retreat to 
placing significant emphasis on the original economic interests of the EU institutions that dominated 
the Court’s reasoning in the early years of the (then) European Economic Community. The most 
telling indication of a deteriorating relationship between the Court and its citizens, however, is the 
response to the specific question referred to the Court that asked about fundamental rights under the 
now binding Charter.  It is the fundamental rights element of the Dano case that has been the focus of 
the human rights literature,
37
 for the evident sidestepping of the application of the Charter is difficult 
to reconcile with not only the legal implications of the art. 6 TEU, but also the normative trajectory of 
the rights discourse which has been developing since the beginning.
38
 
 
Widely considered to be politically charged decision, in Dano, the Court were strict, narrowly 
interpreting what amounted to falling within the scope of the Charter under art. 51(1). Citing the 
importance of the principle of conferral and the text of art. 51(1) – that the Member State must be 
‘implementing Union law’ to fall under the Charter – the Court refused jurisdiction to address 
fundamental rights.
39
 However, inconsistencies emerge from this reasoning. In the past, the Court has 
had the jurisdiction to determine questions even in areas of exclusive competences if the exercise of 
                                                          
34
 Dano (C-333/13), para. 76. 
35
 Ibid para. 76ff. 
36
 Ibid para. 80. 
37
 Daniel Thym, ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for Economically 
Inactive Union Citizens’ (2015) 52 CMLR 17, 48. 
38
 The references to the ECHR in early cases is a good example and indication of this. 
39
 Dano (C-333/13), para. 92. 
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that competence has involved or affects EU law.
40
 This was the direction it was headed in especially 
after the developments made fundamental right protection. From recognising non-discrimination, to 
accepting rights to identity and name,  to rights to respect for family life from art. 8 ECHR and its 
equivalent in art. 7 Charter. Other factors appear to have been considered in this decision which led 
the Court (and AG Wathelet in his Opinion) to decide to significantly narrow the scope of the Charter. 
It is thought, again, to be for political reasons. 
 
The political situation surrounding the Dano decision, with an especially noticeable outcry from the 
UK government,
41
 clearly points to the role this case played in sending a message to the Member 
States about the EU’s liberal governance. In particular, because it addressed benefit tourism and equal 
treatment to welfare as a protected right under the Treaty provisions on citizenship and in the Charter, 
it could be considered ‘an adequate answer to the problem’.42 This may be an answer to suppress the 
growing concerns of intrusion into national autonomy that was rife amongst the right-wing 
Eurosceptics at the time. However, for the overall rights discourse and promotion of the status of 
Union citizenship as a guarantee for enjoyment of other fundamental human rights, the message is 
quite the opposite. What the Dano case seems to suggest is once again being able to consider an 
individual’s economic activity (or lack thereof) to determine whether or not it is proportionate to deny 
or confer rights protected by the citizenship provisions and fundamental rights in the Charter. The 
Court also appears to be limiting the application of the Charter, leading to an overall decline in the 
level of rights protection for individuals, jeopardising what was slowly developing into a good 
relationship between the Court and EU citizens. 
 
This relationship was further jeopardised by the Alimanovic case, decided a year after Dano.
43
 The 
claimant and her daughter, both Swedes living in Germany, applied for welfare benefits after both 
                                                          
40
 Especially in citizenship; see Rottmann (C-135/08) [2010] ECR I-1449.  
41
 See ‘EU 'benefit tourism' court ruling is common sense, says Cameron’ BBC News (11 November 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30002138> [accessed 9 June 2015]. 
42
 Herwig Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: a Narrow or Broad Interpretation of the 
Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52 CMLR 363, 370. 
43
 Alimanovic (C-67/14). 
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becoming unemployed. The question was whether denying them these benefits would be against free 
movement of workers’ rights under art. 45 TFEU, as they were EU citizens who had moved across 
borders to work. The claimants’ undoing were the fact that they were previously working, but now 
unemployed, therefore no longer eligible to invoke art. 45 TFEU. However, seeing that being an EU 
citizen still allowed non-economically active individuals to enjoy equal treatment rights, it was 
strange that in the judgment, EU citizenship rights and fundamental rights were not considered in lieu 
of workers’ rights. Any reference to the Brey case is brief and dismissive; the Court stated that, ‘no 
such individual assessment is necessary in circumstances such as those at issue in the main 
proceedings.’44 Therefore, this suggests that the Court now preferred to engage in a broad-brushed 
assessment of the entire situation. As Dano had already clarified that it was acceptable to deny 
welfare benefits to non-nationals if they were non-economically active, it would be acceptable to do 
so again in Alimanovic, without looking at the specific facts and circumstances which may have 
justified a more liberal and generous approach under fundamental rights protection. 
 
AG Wathelet in his Opinion on Alimanovic noted that ‘[t]he problem is sensitive in human and legal 
terms.’45 However, this observation is interesting given that fundamental human rights neither features 
in his Opinion, nor in the judgment. This would be considered a backwards progression of the 
development made since the formal recognition and conferral of rights to non-economically active 
citizens as part of the protection offered by fundamental rights and its increasing relevance in the 
Court’s jurisprudence. There is an argument to be made as well that there is an element of the right to 
private and family life, and that the rights of the Alimanovic children, who are all EU citizens, are not 
considered.
46
 By refusing to engage with fundamental rights protection, the Court seems to insinuate 
that this is no longer a constitutional priority. 
 
                                                          
44
 Ibid para. 59.  
45
 Opinion of AG Wathelet, ibid, para. 2. 
46
 Teixeira (C-480/08) [2010] ECR I-1107; Ibrahim (C-310/08) [2010] ECR I-1065. See Maria Haag, ‘C‑67/14 
Alimanovic: the not so fundamental status of Union citizenship?’ DELI Blog (29 September 2016) 
<https://delilawblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/29/maria-haag-c%E2%80%916714-alimanovic-the-not-so-
fundamental-status-of-union-citizenship/> [accessed 26 August 2016]. 
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Given the earlier discussions on the trend of citizenship and fundamental rights, it seems inconsistent 
for these cases to now be decided in such a disparate way, excluding any consideration of 
fundamental human rights and even going as far as to put equal treatment to one side for simply being 
non-economically active. The way the Court justifies its decision not to engage with a fundamental 
rights assessment is most troubling. It is evidence of a change in attitude towards the relationship the 
Court has with its subjects, the EU citizens, and seems to once again disregard the progress made and 
the rights protected as a result of the initial integration of citizenship status with fundamental human 
rights protection. These cases are salient examples of the slowly diminishing level of protection 
despite the various constitutional safeguards in place from the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
4 Conclusion 
As history has shown, for a time, there was a steady increase in the rights afforded to and enjoyed by 
EU citizens. It now appears, however, that citizenship status is no longer the “gateway” to 
fundamental rights protection, and it is perhaps doubtful as to whether it ever truly was. As a means of 
demonstrating this point, this article has highlighted how the progress made towards the expansion of 
the scope ratione personae and ratione materiae in citizenship law through fundamental rights 
protection has apparently been curbed by the CJEU adopting a narrower interpretation of the Charter. 
The examples of recent cases dealing with welfare benefits and the gradual decline in the level of 
fundamental human rights protection considered here is telling. By using the Charter and finding 
situations outside its scope, the Court may have found that excluding human rights protection was 
justifiable. However, due to the fundamental rights acquis developing alongside citizenship rights, it 
has been argued that this approach is difficult to reconcile with the previously prominent pro-rights 
discourse. Perhaps more disappointingly, however, the message the Court appears to be sending is 
that this more restrictive approach should be the one favoured in future cases. This cannot be 
considered a positive development for fundamental rights protection and citizens’ rights. 
 
 
